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Modular Production’s Impact on Japan’s Electronics Industry1
Chapter Two in Recovering From Success: Innovation 
 
and Technology Management in Japan, Edited by D. Hugh Whittaker and 
Robert Cole, Oxford University Press, forthcoming. 
 
 
Timothy J. Sturgeon 
 
 
Global integration has accelerated the worldwide flow of knowledge and 
information, causing societies to become embedded in one another in complex ways, 
even as they retain their distinctive characters.  This chapter examines the process of 
global integration through the lens of national industrial models – the collection of 
routines and strategies generally shared by corporate managers in a particular society.  
Some might question the notion of national industrial models, rightly pointing to 
diversity among firms based in a specific society.  All Japanese firms, for example, are 
not the same (Suzuki, 2004).  I would agree with Berger’s (2005) assertion that 
managers face ‘open pathways’ and so can and do choose a range of strategies.  
Nevertheless, societies continue to have distinct cultures, institutions, and histories, and 
so differences persist in the face of global integration in ways that profoundly shape 
corporate strategy.  In the course of sustained field research on the locational and 
organization strategies of more than 500 firms in a variety of industries and countries 
conducted by a team of researchers at the MIT Industrial Performance Center during the 
period 1999-2005, such national characteristics were evident.2
                                               
1  This chapter is based on research funded by ITEC (COE) at Doshisha University, Kyoto, and the Alfred 
P. Sloan Foundation.  The field research was conducted by the author, other members of MIT’s 
Globalization Study Team (see http://ipc-lis.mit.edu/globalization/main.html) and Yoshiji Suzuki of 
Doshisha University.  Clair Brown and Gregory Linden at UC Berkeley, Martin Kenney at UC Davis, and 
Mon-Han Tsai and Kazushi Nakamichi at ITEC, provided important insights and valuable support, as did 
Jun Kurihara of the John F. Kennedy School of government at Harvard University.  Hugh Whittaker and 
Robert Cole provided helpful suggestions for improving the text.  All responsibility for the final text, of 
course, resides with the author. 
  At the same time, the 
managers interviewed were clearly making choices based on what they perceived 
2 At the time of this writing MIT’s Globalization Study Team had conducted 622 field interviews in 19 
countries, including 42 interviews with managers of electronics companies in Japan. 
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companies in other societies to be doing.  It is this process of outside pressure, reflection, 
and response that is at the heart of this chapter’s analysis.  
As a window into the process of global integration, the chapter develops a stylized 
account of Japanese electronics firms’ response to a new organizational model emanating 
from the United States, the Modular Production System.  The account is stylized both 
because it is intended to tell a general story about the Japanese electronics industry and 
because we are required to omit firm-specific data collected during our field interviews to 
protect the personal and corporate confidentiality of our respondents.  There were many 
differences as well as similarities in the strategies chosen and concerns expressed during 
our interviews, and an analysis of these differences would doubtless be fruitful, but my 
aim here is to highlight areas of agreement and similarity. 
 
 
The Evolution and Circulation of Industrial Models 
 
Industrial models consist of a range of norms, practices, routines, and tendencies.  
As such, they are always stereotypical, and firms vary widely in how closely they hew to 
the stereotype.  Nevertheless, industrial models have been characterized at a variety of 
levels.  Some have coalesced at specific historical moments across a wide range of 
countries, such as the post World War II ‘social contract’ between labour and capital that 
emerged in the United States, Europe, and Japan in the post-World War Two period, 
albeit in different forms.  Others have been associated with groups of countries, 
individual countries; industries in specific countries; regions within countries; and even 
individual large firms.  The core idea that has emerged from this work is that alternative 
viable forms of industry and corporate organization can co-exist within capitalism 
(Berger and Dore eds., 1996).   
But what of the notion that global competition and integration accelerate the 
degree to which industrial models influence one another?  There is a rich body of 
literature in this area as well, from work that documents the rise and uneven geographic 
spread of ‘financialization,’ the increased responsiveness of publicly traded firms to 
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pressure from financial analysts and large institutional investors (Lazonick and 
O’Sullivan, 2000; Williams, 2000); to research on how the collection of ‘best’ industrial 
practices known as Lean Production (Womack, Jones, and Roos, 1990) have been 
differentially adopted and adapted by managers from different societal home bases and in 
different industrial sectors (e.g., Abo, 1989: Liker, Fruin, and Adler, 1999).   
The central message here is that industrial models are not static, but evolve with 
time, and that the pace of transformation tends to accelerate when practices are 
transferred from one society to another.  The Japanese Production System, for example, 
emerged in the 1950 and 1960s as Japanese firms adapted the principles of ‘Fordist’ mass 
production to the constraints of the post World War Two Japanese economy, namely 
small markets, scarce capital, and limited consumer spending power (Sayer, 1986).  
Because of the success of Japanese firms in the 1980s, some of the key principals of the 
Japanese Production System in turn had a profound impact on the organization of 
industrial production in the United States and Europe in the 1990s.  But the elements of 
Lean Production were introduced into societies with very different institutional structures 
and industrial histories, and so the process has been one of adaptation and transformation 
rather than simple imitation and adoption.   
There is now a rich literature on how the Japanese Production System has been 
adopted and adapted differentially in various industries, companies, workplaces, and 
stages of the value chain (e.g., Abo, 1989; Kenney and Florida, 1993: Liker, Fruin, and 
Adler, 1999; Holweg and Pil, 2004).  American firms did respond to the Japanese 
Production System, and the MIT book that codified its elements as ‘Lean Production,’ 
The Machine That Changed the World, was extremely influential among managers in the 
automotive industry and beyond.  North American investments by Japanese firms in the 
1980s and 1990s also did much to expose managers and workers at American suppliers to 
key elements of the Japanese Production System.  These lessons resulted in an increased 
focus on quality at American firms, achieved through systematic and continuous defect 
reduction programs and reduced in-process inventories, at least in final assembly (Cole, 
1999).  In the realm of industry organization, however, the value chain elements of Lean 
Production that admonished lead firms to ask more from their suppliers dovetailed with 
other forces in the United States that were both driving and enabling increased 
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outsourcing.  I will refer to the industrial model that emerged from this process as the 
Modular Production System. 
 
 
Value Chain Modularity as a Response to the Japanese Production System 
 
Outsourcing became extremely popular in the United States in the1990s, and it 
was driven by some of the same motivations that exist in Japan: the search for greater 
flexibility in the face of increased international competition and market volatility through 
the transfer of fixed assets and inventory to suppliers.  A close lead firm-suppler 
relationship was a key aspect of the Japanese Production System.  Japanese lead firms 
tend to be relatively vertically integrated, and when suppliers are heavily used, they are 
more likely to be highly dependent on one or a small number of key customer firms.  
Buyer-supplier relationships have traditionally been canted towards affiliates of the same 
industrial group, or keiretsu. The qualification process for new suppliers (Japanese and 
non-Japanese) can be extremely lengthy.  Lead firms may make equity investments in 
their suppliers and can in some cases come to dominate them financially.3
While in the United States outsourcing grew beyond anything that had been 
imagined in Japan, one striking difference was that relationships with suppliers did not 
change their adversarial tone, but retained much of their arms-length, short-term, and 
contractual character (Helper, 1991).   Nevertheless, the challenges of transferring and 
coordinating complex and sensitive information along the supply-chain, reducing in-
process inventories, and ensuring quality remained.  Here American industry drew on its 
  Lead firms 
often provide the required technical assistance and financial support to help affiliated 
suppliers adopt asset-specific production technologies, inventory management, capacity 
planning, and quality control systems.  These tight linkages between lead and suppliers 
have been identified as a source of competitive advantage for Japanese firms (Dyer, 
1996). 
                                               
3 Although this pattern of cross-holding has been quite strong historically, the keiretsu structure has 
loosened considerably in the past decade or so, in part driven by the efforts of foreign investors, such as 
Renault, to drive down the cost of components. See Lincoln, chapter 12, in this volume. 
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long history of systems integration, ‘the art of conceiving, designing, and managing the 
development of large systems involving multiple disciplines and many participating 
organizations’ (Sapolsky, 2003: 31).4
Elsewhere I and others have characterized the new model that emerged in the 
United States during the 1990s, in part as a response to Lean Production and in part as a 
response to home-grown pressures to ‘re-engineer’ the corporate landscape, as the 
‘Modular Production System.’  It is based on value chain specialization, formalization of 
value chain linkages, and an increase in the scale and global reach of each horizontal 
segment — or ‘module’ — of the value chain.
 
5
According to Pavitt (2003), the robustness of systems integration in the face of 
growing complexity in the realm of commercial products has been enabled by advances 
in information technology, especially computer simulation technologies that reduce the 
cost of experimentation and technological search.  This has enabled the development of 
simplified and codified methods for transmitting detailed product and production 
information along the value chain. Specifically, the key business processes that have been 
  In modular value chains distinct breaks 
in the chain of activities tend to form at points where information regarding product and 
process specifications can be highly formalized.  As in modular product design, 
activities tend to remain tightly integrated and based on tacit linkages within functionally 
specialized value chain nodes.  Between these nodes, however, linkages are eased by the 
application of widely agreed-upon protocols and standards.  Discreet nodes of tacit 
activity can reside within divisions of the same firm, but only when activities are 
outsourced can scale economies build up beyond the level of the firm (Langlois and 
Robertson, 1995). 
                                               
4 Systems integration developed as a formal practice in the United States during the Cold War in response 
to a need to coordinate the invention, development, production, deployment, and maintenance of 
increasingly complex and exotic weapons and aerospace systems.  Projects to create complex weapons 
systems such a ballistic missiles, early warning radar systems, and nuclear submarines were so large and 
interdisciplinary that detailed knowledge required to deign and produce all of the sub-systems were far 
beyond the scope of knowledge and expertise contained within any single military branch, firm, university 
labouratory, or other single organization.  Someone had to make sure the systems worked as intended.  At 
first, the task of systems integration fell to a few aerospace contractors, government agencies, and specially 
created non-profit agencies, but over time, the approach and methods of systems integration migrated to the 
private sector as private military contractors gained experience with the approach and systems engineering 
and management became established, if much maligned, academic disciplines by the 1970s (Johnson, 
2003). 
5  Baldwin and Clark 2000; Sturgeon, 2000, 2002; Takeishi and Fujimoto, 2001; Langlois, 2003; Principe 
et al, 2003; Gereffi, Humphrey, and Sturgeon, 2005; Sturgeon and Lee, 2005. 
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computerized are product design (e.g., computer aided design), production planning and 
inventory and logistic control (e.g., enterprise resource planning), as well as various 
aspects of the production process itself (e.g., assembly, test and inspection, material 
handling).  Furthermore, the Internet has provided an ideal vehicle for sharing the data 
generated and used by these systems.  Such technologies and practices are at the core of 
the Modular Production System.  It is the formalization of information and knowledge at 
the inter-firm link, and the relative independence of the participating firms that gives 
value chain modularity its essential character: flexibility, resiliency, speed, and 
economies of scale that accrue at the level of the industry rather than the firm (Sturgeon 
and Lee, 2005).6
Value chain modularity introduces risks as well as benefits for participating firms.  
Responsiveness may suffer as contracts are hammered out.  There is potential for 
intellectual property and other sensitive information about product features, pricing, 
production forecasts, and customers to leak to competitors through shared suppliers.  
The ability of lead firms to innovate and design successive product generations may 
suffer from the atrophying of manufacturing and component knowledge, a problem that 
has been referred to by Chesbrough and Kusunoki (2001) as the ‘modularity trap.’  
Reliance on standard interfaces may lead to the use of standard components, leading in 
turn to a loss of product distinctiveness.  Shared and overlapping inventory resident in 
supplier organizations can lead to distortions and tracking problems that introduce waste.   
 
How the risks and benefits of the Modular Production System balance out 
depends, like all things in business, on execution.  Both lead firms and suppliers must 
perform their respective tasks well, anticipate problems before they occur, and deal with 
them effectively when they inevitably do.  One unavoidable issue is that independent 
firms in buyer-supplier relationships often have competing interests. 
In sum, there appears to be no single best way to organize production.  Takeishi 
and Fujimoto (2003) argue that firms and industries that make products with integral 
                                               
6 The high volume of non-price data flowing across the inter-firm link differentiates modular value chains 
from simple markets.  Because of this complexity it is not unusual that additional engineering and 
coordination be required.  The hand-off of product and process specifications between firms need not be 
perfectly clean, but only relatively so for modular value chains to function. 
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product architectures7
What is clear is that national-scale institutions heavily influence managerial 
choices related to industry organization.  For example, corporate responses to intensified 
competition and market volatility depend on the strength of worker protection and how 
well the institutions of new firm formation function at the level of the nation-state.  In 
the United States, volatility is high, not only because globalization and technological 
change displace workers in vulnerable industries, but also because worker protection laws 
are relatively weak and labour unions have been in serious decline for decades (only 
8.5% of the United States private sector workforce is unionized).  On the other hand, the 
financial and regulatory mechanisms that support entrepreneurship and corporate 
restructuring are very strong, and so volatility has spurred the formation of new kinds of 
businesses that focus on the pooling and rapid redeployment of workers and machines.  
Today, lead firms in the United States can lease almost anything, from workers to trucks 
to entire factories, by making a phone call to Adecco or Ryder or Solectron.  These large, 
specialized suppliers have arisen in direct response to increased volatility.  In countries 
 tend to have integral value chains, while firms and industries that 
make products with modular product architectures tend to have modular value chains.  
But value chain architecture is not always a function of design architecture.  As Baldwin 
and Clark (2000) have shown, there are many cases in which break points in modular 
value chains have been willfully engineered.  While products with highly modular 
design architectures such as the personal computer certainly make value chain modularity 
more likely, even a single modular link in the flow of activities, such as the link between 
an integral design and manufacturing, can unleash the dynamics of value chain 
modularity.  In addition, firms such as Autodesk, Cadence, and Mentor Graphics have 
aggressively created new opportunities for value chain modularity by developing and 
marketing design automation tools that produce files in standard format.  The degree of 
modularity in a given chain of activities thus involves a large measure of strategic choice, 
and is not a simple function of design architecture.  The question, then, is how well a 
given industrial model fits with the product, industry, and larger institutional and 
competitive factors that influence firm strategy. 
                                               
7 Products with integral architectures have tight design interdependencies with components and subsystems 
of which they are comprised. 
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where worker mobility is lower, such as Japan (Brown et al, 1997), the infrastructure and 
motivation for new firm formation tends to remain underdeveloped, and so volatility is 
weakly translated into industry re-organization and modular suppliers of pooled resources 
have not emerged. 
In the American electronics industry, value chain modularity took shape during 
the late 1980s and early 1990s.  Because many established firms had in-house 
manufacturing and components divisions, this change required the break-up of vertically 
integrated corporate structures and the aggregation of cast off activities in suppliers. 
Hewlett Packard and IBM led the way, selling most of their worldwide manufacturing 
infrastructure to contract manufacturers such as Solectron and Flextronics, or spinning off 
internal divisions as merchant contract manufacturers, as IBM did with its Toronto 
manufacturing complex in 1997, creating the contract manufacturer Celestica.  Another 
source of growth in contract manufacturing was increased business from newer firms that 
never built up internal manufacturing divisions, such as the Internet switch company 
Cisco and the computer workstation and server firms Sun Microsystems and Silicon 
Graphics.  
Circuit board and final product assembly work was mostly transferred to contract 
manufacturers based in North America, specifically the big five ‘electronics 
manufacturing services’ (EMS) firms Flextronics, Solectron, Sanmina-SCI, Jabil, and 
Celestica, while the assembly and even some of the design of notebook computers went 
to ‘original equipment’ and ‘original design’ (OEM and ODM) contract manufacturers 
based in Taiwan, such as Quanta, Compal, Inventec, Hon Hai (Foxconn) and the various 
contract manufacturing arms of Acer.  By the end of the1990s, much of the 
manufacturing capacity of the Taiwan-based contract manufacturers had shifted to 
Mainland China, and the big five United States-based contract manufacturers had 
established a global-scale network of factories (Sturgeon and Lester, 2004).  At the level 
of components, the 1990s was a time of rapid growth among ‘fabless’ semiconductor 
design firms as well as the semiconductor foundries that serve them, such as the Taiwan-
based TSMC and UMC, as well as IBM (Linden and Somaya, 2003). Thus, by the end of 
the 1990s, the Modular Production System in the United States electronics industry had 
become fully developed and global in scope. 
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Competitive Challenges to Japan’s Electronics Industry at the End of the 1990s 
 
Value chain modularity came to the attention of Japanese electronics firms in the 
late1990s, triggered by the fantastic growth of the Internet and the huge demand for data 
communications and Internet-enabled enterprise computing equipment that came with it. 
American firms are leaders in nearly all Internet-related electronics hardware and 
software product categories; Cisco Systems and Juniper Networks in Internet routers and 
switches; IBM and Sun Microsystems in powerful computer servers; Dell in personal 
computers; EMC in storage arrays; Microsoft and Netscape in Internet browsers; Yahoo! 
and Google in Internet portals and search engines; Amazon and E-Bay in Internet 
retailing and auctions; and Accenture, Price Waterhouse, McKinsey, and IBM in Internet-
enabled corporate computing networks.  Japanese electronics firms are focused on 
components, stand-alone consumer electronics devices, and proprietary enterprise 
computing systems that connect client sites through private leased data lines.8
The sudden rise of the Internet, and almost complete lack of any driving role for 
Japanese electronics firms in this rise, combined with severe financial losses, initiated a 
period of questioning in the Japanese electronics industry.  Cisco Systems, based in 
California, jumped to an early lead in the market for Internet (TCP/IP) protocol switching 
equipment.  Through a combination of technological excellence and a shrewd and 
efficient acquisition strategy Cisco managed to accrue and maintain an 80% market share 
in Internet routers while continuing to drive innovation in the field (Mayer and Kenney, 
2004). As they rushed to learn about the Internet, Japanese firms looked to Cisco and saw 
some very striking features.  First, Cisco relied almost entirely on third-party systems 
integrators such as Accenture and McKinsey for the creation of fully functional Internet-
enabled data networks and enterprise computing systems.  Even more striking from the 
Japanese point of view was that Cisco did not directly produce its own equipment, but 
relied on contract manufacturers such as Solectron and Flextronics.  Cisco’s success was 
based on its ‘platform leadership’ (Gawer and Cusumano, 2002), that is, its ability to 
   
                                               
8  See Cole, chapter 2, for a detailed account of the Japanese response to the Internet and the weakness of 
Japanese firms in the network equipment sector. 
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drive the standard-setting process through technological and market leadership while 
leveraging the capabilities of its suppliers and customers.  The major Japanese 
electronics firms, on the whole, are much more vertically integrated, with in-house design 
and manufacturing of many sub-systems and components.   
In 2001 competition from American firms in modular production networks 
formed only part of the challenge facing Japanese electronics firms.  Korean firms such 
as Samsung, LG Electronics, and Hyundai are highly vertically integrated.  Similar to 
Japanese firms, large Korean electronics firms tend to follow the ‘components plus 
products’ strategy; they manufacture and sell components on world markets, and use their 
most advanced components first in their own branded products to the degree possible.  
Until the late 1990s, Japanese companies followed the ‘flying geese’ strategy of licensing 
older component technologies to less capable firms in Korea and Taiwan and moving to 
newer technologies without much worry, but by 1999 Korean firms, especially Samsung 
and LG, began to close the gap in specific consumer electronic and component markets, 
such as mobile phones, digital cameras, digital televisions, computer monitors, high 
capacity memory chips, and flat panel displays.   
In Japan, intensified competitive pressure from both the United States and Korea 
fostered the widespread impression that Japanese electronics firms were losing pace.  
This, along with losses at several firms in 1998, focused managerial attention on the 
practices of rival firms and fostered the consideration of radical shifts in strategy.  The 
build-up of the Internet bubble, and its bursting in 2001, whipsawed Japanese electronics 
firms along with the global industry, not because Japanese firms were driving innovation 
in the field, but because they were significant suppliers of components, personal 
computers, and computer peripheral equipment, the sales of which were being driven by 
the expanding Internet.  As a result, the near moratorium on IT spending that followed 
the excesses of the Internet bubble deeply affected Japanese firms along with the rest of 
the industry.  But the losses posted in 2001 and 2002, while very large, were this time 
accompanied by even greater losses at the North American firms that had been most 
caught up in the mania of the Internet boom, such as Lucent, Nortel, JDS Uniphase, and 
Solectron.  Table 3-1 summarizes the financial performance of the largest 10 Japanese 
electronics firms during the period 1997-2004. 
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3. 1. Net Income (Loss), Largest Ten Japanese Electronics Firms, 1996-2004, $M 
Firm name 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 
Matsushita 1,228  764  107  898  376  (3,427) (160) 374  545  
Sony 1,243  1,812  1,409  1,098  152  123  948  785  1,527  
Fujitsu 411  46  (107) 385  77  (3,064) (1,002) 441  297  
NEC 827  387  (1,190) 94  513  (2,499) (202) 364  632  
Toshiba 598  60  (109) (252) 871  (2,035) 152  256  429  
Hitachi 800  41  (2,652) 152  946  (3,876) 229  141  480  
Canon 839  970  862  633  1,215  1,342  1,566  2,446  3,200  
Mitsubishi 76  (864) (351) 224  1,131  (625) (97) 398  663  
Sharp 433  202  36  253  349  91  268  539  716  
Sanyo 157  101  (204) 195  366  11  (506) 119  (1,599) 
Top 10 6,612  3,517  (2,199) 3,681  5,995  (13,959) 1,196  5,862  6,892  
Source: Company reports 
Notes: Except for Canon, dates are approximate calendar years ending on March 31 of the year following 
the year listed.  US dollar figures were derived from average currency "ask" prices for the period April 1 of 
the year listed through March 31of the following year.  Currency pricing was obtained from 
http://www.oanda.com.  
 
The Response to Modular Production: a New Japanese Model?9
 
 
This section examines the strategic responses of Japanese electronics firms to 
Modular Production in the period 2000-2004, responses made in the context of the 
competitive and financial challenges discussed in the previous section.  Our interviews 
reveal that Japanese electronics firms have been strongly influenced by Modular 
Production but that they have, unsurprisingly, resisted certain aspects of the model while 
adopting and adapting others.  What emerged most powerfully in our interviews was the 
depth and scope of the questioning taking place within the highest levels of Japanese 
electronics firms.  One respondent summed up the situation in the late spring of 2001 in 
this way: 
                                               
9 This section is based on several rounds of interviews with top managers at Japan’s largest electronics 
firms, conducted by the author, other members of MIT’s Globalization Study Team (see http://ipc-
lis.mit.edu/globalization/main.html) and Yoshiji Suzuki of Doshisha University. The interviews were semi-
structured in that the same themes were covered, were conducted at the respondent’s office, and typically 
lasted 1-2 hours.  The names of the firms and managers are withheld for reasons of confidentiality.  The 
respondents typically, but not always, occupied high-level decision-making positions at their firm. 
  12 
Mega-competition means we are facing strong companies with narrow core competence, such 
as Micron and Dell.  Such single-function players are very strong.  We are an all around 
diversified player so we cannot fight such players with agility.  We have convened a series of 
one-day meetings to determine how to survive. (Japanese electronics executive, June, 2001) 
 
The dilemmas and contradictions facing the largest Japanese electronics 
companies were great during the interview period, as they continue to be today.  
Japanese electronics firms are highly diversified and have large numbers of employees 
both in Japan and abroad.  For firms selling enterprise computing systems, key 
customers in Japan, which prominently include national and local governments, are 
demanding IT systems comprised of the best hardware and software in the world, and 
since such systems now must be Internet-compatible or even Internet-based, this often 
means using elements created by non-Japanese companies.  For firms selling consumer 
electronics products and electronic components, competition is intense from low-cost 
producers with modular value chains, such as Dell in personal computers, and with high 
levels of vertical integration, such as Samsung in mobile phones and flash memory chips.   
These pressures prompted decision-makers at Japanese electronics firms to consider new 
strategies to rapidly acquire or develop new competencies, increase specialization, and 
relocate in-house operations to low-cost locations such as China.  At the same time, the 
managers we spoke to agreed that it would be politically and strategically impossible to 
enact the layoffs that would be required if radical restructuring was taken too far. 
The bursting of the Internet bubble in early 2001 led Japanese managers to step 
back from the brink of radical transformation.  The ‘dot.com’ crash dramatically exposed 
some apparent weaknesses of the Modular Production System.  As a result of over-
anticipating demand, Cisco was forced to liquidate $2.2 billion of finished and in-process 
inventory, largely held by its contract manufacturers. The company cut 8,500 jobs and 
posted its first loss in its 11 years as a public company ($2.69 billion) in the third quarter 
of 2001 (Niece, 2005).  Over the next few years Solectron, Cisco’s most important 
contract manufacturer, suffered a total of $6.5 billion in losses and laid off nearly a third 
of its global workforce of 60,000.  
However effective these developments were in driving Japanese firms back to 
their traditional industrial model, managers at Japanese electronics firms have 
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nevertheless made significant breaks with past practices.   Only key components, such 
as system-on-a-chip (SoC) — known in Japan as LSI — semiconductors, leading-edge 
flat panel displays, high-capacity batteries, and advanced memory chips are to be 
produced in Japan, either in-house or in joint-ventures with other Japanese firms.  In-
house final assembly in Japan is largely being limited to high-cost models with advanced 
features.  Low-end products are to be produced offshore, especially in China, either by 
affiliates or by Taiwanese contractors.  Divestiture of old, unprofitable, and unrelated 
businesses and products lines has accelerated, though these moves comprise only an 
incremental step toward downsizing and specialization.  Increased specialization, 
increased complexity, and the continued importance of foreign component sales has led 
to increased outside purchasing and higher dependence on global markets for a wider 
variety of inputs, including technology inputs.10
Alliances 
   The remainder of this section presents 
evidence of these changes, and their limits, in three areas: alliances, outsourcing, and 
information technology and communications services. 
The renewal of traditional strategies at Japanese electronics firms has a high price.  
The fast pace of technological change in the technologies that underlie key components 
has required a spate of new investments in leading-edge factory production in Japan (see 
table 3-2 for some examples).  The high cost of many of these new investments has 
convinced managers to forge an unprecedented set of production-sharing alliances. Seven 
of the twenty-five factory investments listed in Table 3-2 involve more than one firm.  
The shift in thinking about alliances is captured by the following statements made by the 
same top manager in 2001 and 2002: 
We have a terrace-house style management where we exchange ideas with people in the same 
house, so we don’t want to sell our factories to other people.’ (Japanese electronics executive, 
June, 2001)  ‘We’re thinking of a smaller terrace house now.  And we’re also thinking about 
having good neighbours.’  (same Japanese electronics executive, July, 2002) 
 
                                               
10 For example, most large Japanese electronics firms have licensed processor cores, a modular block of 
design code (or ‘IP block’) for inclusion in SoC semiconductors, from the British firm Advanced RISC 
Machines Ltd. (ARM) as a way to stimulate business in Europe, where ARM technology amounts to a de 
facto standard for embedded communications equipment. 
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3. 2 Examples of recent and planned electronics factory investments in Japan 






(Hitachi – Mitsubishi joint 
venture spin-off) 
semiconductors (system LSI) Hitachinaka, Ibaraki 200 latter half of2005 
Elpida Memory (Hitachi – 





NEC Electronics semiconductors (system LSI) Tsuruoka, Yamagata 100 latter half of2005 
Toshiba semiconductors (flash memory) Yokaichi, Mie 270 
latter half 
of2005 




(Hitachi – Mitsubishi – 
NEC joint venture spin-off) 
semiconductors (system LSI, 
flash memory) Kagami, Kochi 200 undecided 
Matsushita semiconductors (system LSI) Uozu, Toyama 130 latter half of2005 
Sony semiconductors (microprocessor) Isahaya, Nagasaki 200 
first half 
of2005 
Sony semiconductors (CCD) Kyushu (undecided) 100 undecided 
Sharp semiconductors (flash memory) 
Fukuyama, 
Hiroshima 50 
first half of 
2006 
Oki semiconductors (undecided) Kiyotake, Miyazaki 100 undecided 
Toshiba Matsushita 
Display Technology 
liquid crystals for cellular 
phones Kawakita, Ishikawa 50 April, 2006 
Sharp liquid crystal displays for TVs Kameyama, Mie 150 June, 2006 
IPS liquid crystal displays for TVs Mobara, Chiba 110 2nd Q, 2006 
Toshiba-Canon SED displays Taiji, Hyogo 180 January, 2007 
Matsushita (Panasonic) plasma displays Ibaragi, Osaka 60 April, 2004 
Matsushita (Panasonic) - 
Toray plasma displays Amagasaki, Hyogo 95 
September, 
2005 
Fujitsu Hitachi plasma 
display plasma displays Kunitomi, Miyazaki 85 
latter half of 
2006 
Pioneer plasma displays Tatomi, Yamanashi 26-27 September, 2004 
Konica Minolta polarizing film for liquid crystal displays Kobe, Hyogo 30 autumn, 2006 
Fuji film film for flat panel displays Kikuyo, Kumamoto 100 December, 2006 
Dainihon insatsu film for liquid crystal panels Kitakyushu, Fukuoka 30 end of 2006 
Toppan insatsu film for liquid crystal panels Hisai, Mie 50 October, 2006 
Sumitomo Chemical polarized plates Niihama, Ehime 10 autumn, 2006 
Asahi glass glass plates for liquid crystal panels Takasago, Hyogo 25 autumn, 2006 
Source: Nikkei Shinbun, various dates 
 
In contrast to the technology and standards development deals forged with 
American and European firms in the 1980s, most of these recent agreements have been 
between Japanese firms.  In some cases the deals are simple technology development 
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and patent sharing deals between firms with complementary assets and capabilities.  In 
other cases firms have combined component divisions and spun them off as separate 
companies.  In still other cases firms have purchased the divisions of other firms to gain 
control over needed components or to build larger, more viable divisions, especially in 
the face of volatile global markets and fierce competition (e.g., DRAMs).  Of the 
greatest interest and significance are eight deals listed in Table 3-3 that involve joint 
factory investments, where partner firms share output.  Such deals require significant 
investment that heighten risk and make withdrawal difficult.  Alliances of this kind 
create shared factory space, and shared risk.  They move the Japanese electronics 
industry in the direction of Modular Production in that large fixed investments are pooled 
and shared by a number of industry players.  But in this case the number of firms sharing 
capacity is limited to the members of the alliance, which is typically two, and in a few 
cases, three firms. 
Overall, this restructuring activity is leading the Japanese electronics industry on a 
path toward greater specialization, concentration, and fixed capital sharing.  These are 
the same goals that American firms have sought as they have moved toward the Modular 
Production System, albeit pursued in somewhat different and more partial way.  Table 3-
3 provides some examples of recent restructuring in the Japanese electronics industry, 
including mergers, spin-offs, acquisitions, and alliances.   
 
3. 3. Examples of recent restructuring in the Japanese electronics industry 
Partners (% share) Year announced Products Type of deal 
Sony  – Konica - Minolta 2005 digital still cameras (SLR) joint product development 
Matsushita - Olympus 2005 digital still cameras (SLR) joint product development 
Hitachi - Matsushita 2005 flat panel displays (plasma) 
joint R&D, production, marketing and 
intellectual property sharing 
Hitachi (50%) – Matsushita 
(23.4%) – Toshiba (23.4%) 2004 
flat panel displays (liquid 
crystal) joint production 
NEC - Pioneer 2004 flat panel displays (plasma) sale to Pioneer 
Seiko Epson (55%) – Sanyo 
(45%) 2004 
flat panel displays (liquid 
crystal) merger and spin off 
Toshiba - Mitsubishi 2004 semiconductors sale to Mitsubishi 
Sharp - Sony Ericsson 2004 software for cellular phones joint development 
Casio (51%) – Hitachi (49%) 2003 cellular phones joint product development, design and purchasing 
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Konica - Minolta 2003 cameras, printers, and copiers etc merger 
Fujitsu 2002 flat panel displays (liquid crystal) spin off of division 
Hitachi (55%) - Mitsubishi 
(45%) (Renesas Techology) 2002 
semiconductors (system 
LSI) 
merger and spin off of R&D, product 
development, production and marketing 
Mitsubishi – NEC – Hitachi 
(Elpida Memory) 2002 semiconductors (DRAM) 
merger and spin off of R&D, product 
development, production and marketing 
Toshiba (60%) – Matsushita 
(40%) 2001 
flat panel displays (liquid 
crystal) joint production 
NEC 2001 semiconductors (network applications) spin-off 
Sony – Toshiba - IBM 2001 semiconductors (system LSI) joint product development 
Matsushita - NEC 2001 software for cellular phones joint product development 
Matsushita - Toray 2000 flat panel displays (plasma) joint venture 
Fujitsu - Hitachi 1999 flat panel displays (plasma) joint production 
Toshiba (50%) – Canon (50%) 1999 flat panel displays (SED) joint R&D and production 
NEC (50%) – Hitachi (50%) 1999 semiconductors (DRAM) merger and spin off of R&D, product development, production and marketing 
Mitsubishi - Matsushita 
Electronic 1998 
semiconductors (system 
LSI) joint product development 
Toyota Jido Shokki (50%) – 
Sony (50%) 1997 
flat panel displays (liquid 
crystal) joint venture 
Source: Trade press publications and Nikkei Shinbun 
 
Outsourcing 
In the realm of outsourcing as well, Japanese electronics firms have taken a partial 
step in the direction of Modular Production.  Dense interactions between design and 
manufacturing is one of the hallmarks of the Japanese Production System, and much 
criticism was leveled at the tendency at American firms’ to “throw designs over the wall” 
to manufacturing (Kenney and Florida, 1993).  But this was one lesson of Lean 
Production that went largely unheeded in the United States.  On the contrary, one of the 
most significant challenges to the traditional Japanese system posed by Modular 
Production is the notion that manufacturing can be entirely separated from product 
development.  Were American firms simply misguided or had technology enabled new 
ways of organizing the value chain?  One respondent put the question this way: 
Traditionally we thought that if we don't keep manufacturing, we can't keep our core 
technological competence. US firms threw that out. This is the central question. For ‘analog’ 
manufacturing, where you have the in-house accumulation of technology, [outsourcing] is 
dangerous. For ‘digital’ manufacturing, [outsourcing] is OK.  But does digital equipment 
  17 
eliminate the accumulation of manufacturing expertise? This is one of my questions. We need 
at least to keep experimental pilot plants in Japan. For manufacturing technologies, like 
miniaturization, there is real Japanese strength. What will US core competence be if all their 
manufacturing goes? New technology must combine various technologies and expertise 
within the company. The question is: can we throw manufacturing out of this mix totally? 
(Japanese electronics executive, July, 2001). 
 
The general strategy in Japan has been to keep the production of leading edge 
products in-house but embrace outsourcing for high-volume, price-sensitive products 
such as low-end personal computers, mobile phones, and previous generation video game 
consoles.  But instead of American contract manufacturers, Taiwan-based contract 
manufacturers have received the lion’s share of these new orders from Japanese firms.  
Taiwanese contract manufacturers were thought to have access to lower cost capital and 
be willing to tolerate lower returns on investment than Japanese firms.  Taiwanese 
manufacturers of commodity flat panel displays, personal computers, and mobile phones 
are especially popular.  Some use of Taiwan’s semiconductor foundries (TSMC and 
UMC) was reported as well.  Japanese managers have confined the use of contract 
manufacturers to older and simpler products and components because of the engineering 
time required to transfer specifications and because they fear the leakage of intellectual 
property.  One respondent put it as follows: 
Some of our products require special components and finishes.  If we used a Taiwanese 
[contractor], we would also use them as parts vendors, and we’d have to teach them about this 
[advanced process], and we don’t want to — it would take too much of our engineering time. 
Eventually they will be able to do everything, but we don't want to teach them so quickly.  
It’s a constant decision to figure out how much of our resources to invest in teaching them as 
opposed to the cost of doing it ourselves. Moreover it leads to the leakage of our intellectual 
property. Eventually they catch up — but maybe we can delay that (Japanese electronics 
executive, October 2004) 
 
This statement reveals a deep ambivalence about outsourcing that has not been as 
evident in American electronics firms, which tend to deal with such problems by 
codifying complex product specifications and punishing suppliers that try to compete 
with them by withdrawing business.  While not unheard of, American companies have 
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had no appreciable problems with IP leakage to rivals via shared suppliers.  Managers of 
Japanese electronics firms, in contrast, have largely opted to continue traditional 
strategies that seek to develop and leverage synergies within their organizations.  As one 
respondent put it:  
In can be an advantage to have both components and [final products] in-house; we can use 
advanced components in our own products first and introduce new features faster.  If 
manufacturing is outsourced, 100% of the strength of Japanese companies will die.  
Launching new models quickly is the key. If we don’t have a manufacturing function, we will 
not be able to launch new products based on new [in-house] technologies, such as batteries, 
LCDs, and semiconductors, nor could we make modifications to existing products.  The 
ability to make incremental modifications on the factory floor is important. Dell doesn’t 
create. They will have a hard time creating new products because they depend on outside 
[contract manufacturers] that have no unique technology.  Making parts and products is 
important. When products are commodities, then using [contract manufacturers] is OK, but 
advanced products are better made in-house. (Japanese electronics executive, June 2001) 
 
Still, it was recognized that the benefits of this strategy were declining with the 
increased ability to codify product and process information that has come with 
digititzation.  One respondent put the problem this way: 
With digital technology it becomes easier to gain the capability to manufacture.  It’s easier to 
make personal computers than televisions.  Everyone can buy the technology.  The machines 
embody the instructions.  It’s no longer a ‘black box’; the Japanese advantage when it used to be 
that way is eroding.  For example, the Koreans can simply buy the machines and have the 
technology. (Japanese electronics executive, July, 2001.) 
 
On the other hand, in some areas the increasing consolidation of functionality 
enabled by digitization has created new technical challenges and a greater need to 
integrate product and component design efforts.  The Japanese managers we spoke with 
believed this to be especially true in the case of system-on-a-chip semiconductors.11
United States companies specialize in a core competence, a piece of the value chain.  We do 
it all: system LSI, [product] design, manufacturing, production equipment, and marketing.  
  As 
one respondent put it: 
                                               
11 This is in contrast to American lead firms, which commonly source their SoC semiconductors externally 
or do the logic design in-house and outsource the remaining design and fabrication tasks (Greg Linden, 
personal communication, September 2005). 
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The main business [of our division] is to manufacture digital audio-visual products.  To do 
this we must co-develop with our semiconductor group.  We can put all of our knowledge 
about system design into the LSI design.  The system LSI made by a specialist may not work 
as well or fit as well within the final product.  In the past we could buy key components from 
the outside, but now system LSI determines everything so we buy these from inside.  But this 
is the exception.  Other components can be bought from the outside.  (Japanese electronics 
executive, October 2004) 
 
Another respondent listed the benefits of in-house system-on-a-chip 
semiconductor production as: 
 ‘Speed, cost, and intellectual property protection.’  ‘When outside vendors are used, 
roadmaps are leaked to competitors.  Inside we don’t have that problem.’ (Japanese 
electronics executive, October 2004) 
 
Our interviews suggest that by 2003 the questioning on the topic of outsourcing 
had led only to modest changes.  One of the main difficulties was the work force 
reductions that would be required for more radical restructuring. 
If we got rid of manufacturing, we’d have to get rid of 50% of our workforce.  We couldn’t 
survive if we did that because other stakeholders, like the governments who procure our 
services, couldn’t accept our doing such a thing.  (Japanese electronics executive, July, 2002) 
 
Severe workforce reductions were also seen as problematic because of their effect 
on morale.  As one respondent put it: 
We can't just fire people, because if we did, we couldn't keep the others. This is the Japanese 
way of business; we can’t just adopt the American way. We have to make full use of Japanese 
people. If we fire the laggards, the talented promising people will think about their own future 
and also leave. They would think that [our company] is not a good place to work. We are 
building up some outside companies like real estate and maintenance to absorb excess people, 
but all this has to happen slowly. We are thinking of cutting some businesses, but this must be 
done gradually, according to the Japanese way. (Japanese electronics executive, June, 2001) 
 
To sum up, Japanese firms appear to have settled on a mixed model in the realm 
of outsourcing.  Advanced components and products are to be produced in-house or in 
joint ventures, and older, simpler, and non-strategic components and products lines are to 
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be outsourced.  While this strategy might seem clear and decisive on its face, it provides 
no real guidance on how far to take outsourcing.  What comprises a core technology, a 
key component, or advanced product?  How soon should advanced process technologies 
be transferred to outside suppliers?  It was recognized that the definition of core 
competencies and key components would shift over time.  One respondent summarized 
this point as follows: 
In regard to outsourcing, we have a mixed model.  We make key components in-house. We 
must choose these key components carefully and engage in constant search and revision.  
What is considered key will change over time. Then, we must choose our real high tech 
collaborators; firms that can provide specialties and have special R&D capabilities. (Japanese 
electronics executive, October, 2004) 
 
What this suggests is that Japanese electronics firms face the same strategic 
challenges that their foreign competitors do and have similarly moved in the direction of 
Modular Production, in most cases for older product lines but in other cases with the aim 
of developing high-level technological collaborations.  But even in the case of older, 
non-strategic products, the migration of in-house production to low-cost locations, 
especially China, was mentioned at least as often as outsourcing.  What is clear is that 
the degree and speed of these changes are limited in the Japanese institutional context.  
The following statement sums up this point well: 
Suppose we do away with all of our plants and fire all of our workers  If we were driven to 
this we might do it, but in Japan you can’t do this.  It is our policy to protect [manufacturing 
workers’] jobs.  It is part of our mission as a company.  So we must continue to develop 
products that cannot easily be outsourced.  Putting parts together is the job of a trading 
company.  We are not a trading company.  This is why we cannot do what Apple computer 
has done [externally sourcing the components and assembly of its iPod digital music player].  
(Japanese electronics executive, March, 2004) 
 
Information technology and communications services 
As they lost money in the late 1990s, Japanese electronics firms with the breadth 
to supply large-scale corporate computing systems saw a solution to their financial woes 
through growth in the service side of their business, following IBM’s long success in this 
area.  An expanding information technology and communications (ITC) services 
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business is attractive in many ways, not least in its potential to absorb a large number of 
employees in high-value-added, knowledge-intensive work.  But customized ITC 
systems and IT-enabled business services tend to require a deep and thorough 
understanding of the end user’s line of business and close collaboration to identify and 
fulfill the buyer’s needs.  Such ‘domain knowledge’ is typically industry-specific, 
requiring knowledge that is applicable only to relatively narrow ‘vertical’ markets, so 
there is an obvious knowledge gap.12
Competing with foreign ITC service firms even in Japan has proved difficult, and 
Japanese electronics firms have found that their product lines and service offerings are 
not considered serious contenders.  One reason for this is Japanese electronics firms’ 
continued bias toward using their own products for the ITC systems they sell.  The 
provision of advanced ITC services to Japanese customers, but especially to global 
clients, introduces a contradiction with the traditional Japanese way of doing business.  
Japanese electronics firms, when providing complete ITC systems to clients, produce and 
thus have an incentive to supply a full range of their own hardware products, from 
components to PCs to servers to large computers to networking equipment, as well as 
software.  With the deployment of global-scale data communications systems, and 
especially since the rise of interoperability based on Internet, or TCP/IP, protocols, it has 
become much easier and in some cases necessary to integrate hardware and software 
from a variety of vendors.  In fact, many customers, even in Japan, believe that their 
systems should be built from best products available.  It has been very difficult for 
Japanese electronics firms to adopt this model, not least because of strongly held notions 
about the learning synergies between various components of large complex systems. In 
addition, sales forces have little or no experience selling products from outside vendors, 
  Japanese electronics firms have very little 
experience providing ITC services outside of Japan.  There is, moreover, a great deal of 
competition in the realm of ITC services, both from other integrated electronics hardware 
and software firms such as IBM and from services-only consulting firms, such as 
Accenture, Price Waterhouse, and McKinsey. 
                                               
12  See Rtischev and Cole (2003) for an analysis of the not always wise penchant of large Japanese firms 
to try to use expanding businesses to absorb redundant labour. 
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and may well have incentive structures that discourage this practice. One executive 
explained this dilemma as follows: 
Five to seven years ago, there were no cases of United Sates [firms’] success in selling [IT 
systems] in Japan, but today, even local governments are choosing whoever has the best 
integration package.  If we try to sell only our own products we’ll lose business.  We do 
have one case where we sold a big system integration solution with no in-house products.  It 
included only American-made hardware and software.  Our engineers on that project asked, 
‘What company am I working for?’ But pure systems integration like this is profitable.  
(Japanese electronics executive, July, 2001) 
 
Debates about shifting from manufacturing to services at Japanese electronics 
firms have apparently been quite intense.  For now, it seems as if the integrated approach 
has won the day.  This is captured well by the following three statements made by the 
same high-level Japanese electronics executive: 
July 2001: Now we want to change from a hardware to a software and services solutions 
business, so we need more differentiation to fit customers in every country.  Will turning 
away from manufacturing create weakness?  We are struggling to find an answer.  Even on 
government programmes, we can’t do it ourselves and so we are using some American firms 
as sub-contractors.  Accenture, Mckinsey, and Price Waterhouse and others have a very good 
business in Japan and can win bids over us.  Our engineers make full use of our products 
first.  So customers prefer to go with American companies because they’ll provide integrated 
packages using the best components from a variety of vendors.  Our engineers are trying to 
integrate products from Cisco and others but sales and engineering issues force them to use 
our own products, so we lose some bids.  
 
July 2002: There are two different views at our company.  Some say we should simply be 
good at choosing the best components, but others say anyone could package them in the same 
way.  They would be standardized parts, so anyone could do the same thing.  Where’s the 
competitive advantage for us then? With no differentiating hardware, there is no way of 
succeeding in a pure software/services business.  How would we make profits in such a 
business?  In this view, we need to maintain advanced hardware capabilities.  
 
October 2004: Service companies cannot expect to make profits.  We found we cannot make 
money from just software services.  Even IBM is facing losses from its system integration 
business.  Competition is too tough in being a pure provider of services.  Therefore my 
opinion now is that we need to keep making all the necessary hardware in our company. Some 
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people in our company said we should lead in services and software and use the best hardware 
we can find whether it’s ours or another company’s.  Gradually we realized that the company 
that produces the key hardware in-house can provide customers with the confidence and 




The failure of Japanese electronics firms to participate fully in the Internet-fueled 
growth in the global electronics industry during the late 1990s triggered a period of 
questioning among the top executives in Japan’s leading electronics firms.  At the time, 
the Modular Production System emanating from the United States seemed to be 
providing American firms with significant competitive advantages.  Moreover, the key 
features of the Modular Production System provided a direct challenge to a host of the 
most cherished strategies of Japanese electronics firms.  In Modular Production, 
manufacturing capacity is pooled in specialized contract manufacturers, freeing lead 
firms to engage in ‘open innovation’ (Chesbrough, 2003) by specializing in specific 
aspects of technology development and system architecture while depending on outside 
firms for complementary system elements.  The goal of ‘platform leaders’ (Gawer and 
Cusumano, 2002) in the Modular Production System is to attain early market dominance 
to set standards in emerging technologies, thereby forcing ‘partner’ firms to create 
products, subsystems, and components that comply with the standards they set.  These 
strategies clash with the strongly held belief among Japanese managers that competitive 
advantage comes from design collaboration within a diversified organization, tight 
feedback between internal design and manufacturing, and the first-use of internally 
developed components. 
The bursting of the Internet bubble in 2001, and the ensuing inventory and 
financial problems at firms closely associated with Modular Production such as Cisco and 
Solectron, affirmed the skepticism of Japanese managers regarding the model. Our 
interviews after 2003 suggested that the pressure for radical moves away from 
manufacturing had lost momentum and that traditional strategies of vertical integration 
were being reasserted, especially for advanced products and technologies.  In addition, 
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financial performance at many large Japanese electronics companies improved in 2004, 
driven in significant degree by rising demand from Japanese customers with booming 
sales to China for products such as steel, ships, and heavy machinery.  Only the threat 
from Korea failed to diminish.   
So the period of intense questioning came to an end, at least temporarily, as 
decisions were taken to deepen traditional strategies, especially for advanced products 
and technologies.  Japanese electronics firms continue to have shallow, tactical alliances 
with foreign firms, and have reasserted their vertically integrated approach by investing 
in a new round of factory construction — in Japan — for key components such as 
system-on-chip semiconductors, advanced flat panel displays, high capacity batteries, and 
high-performance memory chips.  There have been partial but significant steps taken in 
the direction of Modular Production in the form of increased specialization, outsourcing 
of low-end products, and shared factory investments in Japan, but wholesale restructuring 
has been resisted, at least for now. 
However slowly it may be moving, restructuring at Japanese electronics firms is 
indeed underway, and most large firms reported reductions in their global workforces by 
10-15% since the late 1990s, mostly through attrition.  Still, this restructuring is 
proceeding under the substantial weight of existing organizational routines, investments, 
and workforces, and is being driven by contradictory pressures.  As a result, Japanese 
electronics firms are simultaneously shedding and protecting jobs, getting out of old 
business lines and adding new ones, opening their sourcing networks and investing in 
new in-house component plants, and expanding some facilities and shrinking or closing 
others, both off- and on-shore, in an effort to rebalance their organizations.  While it is 
too early to determine how successful these changes will be, or if they will add up to a 
new and distinct industrial model in the end, there are a host of new challenges and 
opportunities that now face Japanese electronics firms given their recent experiments 
with joint technology development, production alliances, relocation, and global 
outsourcing. Whether Japanese electronics firms can simultaneously and quickly shed 
non-core business, develop new software and service competencies, and carry the weight 
of the substantial new component manufacturing investments, many of which are being 
made in the context of new and completely untested alliances, is unknown. 
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Finally, what do recent trends in the Japanese electronics industry tell us about the 
global circulation of industrial models?  First, firms can and do react to external 
pressures for change, but in a complex and increasingly integrated world, there are 
multiple models that are viable at any given moment, and even if a particular model is 
quite popular, firms receive mixed signals from the outside. For Japanese electronics 
firms, challenges have come not only from the Modular Production System, but also from 
Korean firms such as Samsung and LG Electronics, which remain highly vertically 
integrated.  Second, the resistance to radical change is typically quite high, so changes 
tend to be introduced in piecemeal fashion.  It is this process of partial application, 
experimentation, and reversal, however, that could work to create a new model, one well 
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